Various Indian media outlets have reported that there has been an upgradation in Chinese infrastructure on Myanmar’s Coco Islands. Since the 1990s, India has alleged that China built a 45-50 metre antenna tower on Great Coco with the ability to intercept signals. However, in 2005, the then Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Arun Prakash put the apprehensions to rest by stating that there were no Chinese military installations on the islands. Despite the statement by the Former Admiral, Coco Islands continued to feature in India’s security concerns and was also seen as a part of China’s “String of Pearls” strategy. Now, an article with new satellite imagery posted on Chatham House by Damien Symon and John Pollock shows evidence of new construction activity on the Great Coco Island.
It must be noted that the island already had a 1.3 km long runway before it was extended to 2.3 km over the last decade. There is a radar station south of the runway. But significant changes are coming to light now. The runway has been widened along with the construction of new hangars and possibly accommodation blocks. In addition, the gap between Great Coco Island and Jerry Island in the south has been bridged by a causeway. Jerry Island is a kilometre-long island and a road has been constructed to the southern tip where a sizeable chunk of land is cleared for future construction purposes.
With the approximate details available, the question to be asked is what will the island base hold? Notwithstanding future upgrades, it appears that Coco Island can host high-performance aircraft like Chengdu J-10 (Vigorous Dragon) or light attack aircraft like Guizhou JL-9 Shanying and Hongdu JL-10. However, factors like the location of the island deep inside the Bay of Bengal and the risk of losing a pilot either in peace or war, make the potential base difficult to operate. Rather it can be presumed that the island will instead host unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities like Chengdu Wing-Loong (Pterodactyl) and Guizhou WZ-7 Soaring Dragon. If this becomes a reality, it is bound to make India uncomfortable as the Andaman and Nicobar Command based in Port Blair is in proximity. In addition, China would be able to keep an eye on India’s naval and air assets and their movements on the latter’s east coast.
Major bases like INS Adyar in Chennai, INS Virabahu and the upcoming base for India’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) INS Varsha in Vishakhapatnam are around 1000 to 1200 km from the Great Coco Island. As India conducted six Malabar exercises on the east coast and the Bay of Bengal over the last 10 years, China will be eager to observe future naval exercises in the region from a close distance.
But an audacious plan like this to keep India on its toes has its own set of challenges. Apart from the originally stated factors like the location of the island and the risk of losing personnel, China will have to keep a robust logistics chain connecting the port of Kyaukpyu or Yangon with Coco Island. As Myanmar’s Tatmadaw battles numerous insurgent groups in different parts of the country, there are risks of convoys getting caught in the crossfire. The closest port to Coco Island is Yangon which is only 425 km away and still far from the logistics point of view. In the event of hostile posturing, the Indian military can buy time to launch an operation and fulfil critical objectives.
Although India has a geographic advantage vis-a-vis Coco islands and its military has a rich experience in engaging with key strategic partners like the United States, Japan, Australia, France and the United Kingdom, it cannot afford to be complacent at the political level. India knows very well that China is actively involved with countries in its neighbourhood where investments are pushed to build ports, highways and railway networks. China has also demonstrated its willingness in backing Myanmar on the international stage following the coup that ousted the democratic government. Indian experts are apprehensive about the fact that sanctions by the US and the international community on Myanmar’s military junta will only push it to depend more on Chinese arms and equipment along with financial aid. In such a scenario, it will be a challenge for Indian authorities to communicate their concerns with their Myanmarese counterparts. Even in a hypothetical scenario, if the inhabitants of the Great Coco Island and Jerry Island after further upgradation turn out to be personnel from the Tatmadaw and not Chinese PLA forces/assets, the aforementioned political scenario can enable the Chinese to use the Tatmadaw to conduct ISR operations on one hand and maintain plausible deniability with India on the other. Therefore, India must hasten the development of its dual-use infrastructure on the east coast and Andaman and Nicobar islands, pick up pace in development, trials and commission of military platforms and weapons, catch up on trends in military technology and war-fighting strategies to fight or deter future conflicts. Simultaneously, India must overcome its bureaucratic hurdles to unlock its economic potential so that it can leverage its influence with its immediate and extended neighbourhood to keep China’s influence at bay.
Very good article. The importance of listening posts to track Chinese vessels in IOR could have been mentioned.